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How should we regulate systemic risk? Many regulatory responses,
like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically
motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or
not they exist).2 To be most effective, however, the regulation must be
situated within a more analytical framework.

I. SCOPE AND GOALS OF REGULATION

First, we need to consider the scope of systemic risk regulation. There
has been a great deal of regulatory focus on banks and other financial
institutions (hereinafter, “financial firms”). Some of this is path dependent:
historically, a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of
systemic risk. The media and politicians also have focused on financial firms
because they are so visible and their problems have been so dramatic.

But we also need to recognize that the ongoing trend towards
disintermediation—enabling companies to directly access the ultimate
source of funds, the capital markets, without going through financial
intermediaries—is making financial markets themselves increasingly central
to any examination of systemic risk. 3

For example, although the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008
filled the headlines, its trigger was the collapse of the market for mortgage2

The Dodd-Frank Act delegates much of the regulatory details to administrative rulemaking, in many cases
after the relevant government agencies engage in further study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act
creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential
systemic threats in order to find regulatory gaps. Dodd-Frank Act § 112. The Council will be aided in this
task by a newly-created and, hopefully, nonpartisan Office of Financial Research. Id. Regulators therefore
will have the ability to look beyond the Act’s confines.
3
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 200 (2008).
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backed securities. Many of these securities were collateralized in part by
risky subprime home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced
through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the
borrowers could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted. These defaults
caused substantial amounts of investment-grade rated mortgage-backed
securities to be downgraded and, in some cases, to default. Investors began
losing confidence in these and other rated securities, and their market prices
started falling.

Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed
securities, was particularly exposed. Lehman’s counterparties began
demanding additional safeguards, which Lehman could not provide. Absent
a government bailout, Lehman filed for bankruptcy. That, in turn, caused
securities markets to panic; even the short-term commercial paper market
virtually shut down, and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities
collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the mortgage loans
backing those securities. 4 That accelerated the death spiral, causing financial
firms holding mortgage-backed securities to appear, if not be, more
financially risky; requiring highly leveraged firms to engage in fire-sales of
assets (thereby exacerbating the fall in prices); and shutting off credit
markets, which impacted the real economy.

This illustrates that both financial firms and financial markets can, if
they fail, be triggers and transmitters of systemic risk. The scope of any
4

Even prior to Lehman’s collapse, MBS may have been undervalued in the market. For example, in July
2008 I was an expert in the Orion Finance SIV case in the English High Court of Justice. Orion’s
mortgage-backed securities had a market value of around 22 cents on the dollar, whereas the present value
of its reasonably-expected cash flows was around 88 cents on the dollar because most of the mortgages
were prime.
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regulatory framework for managing systemic risk should therefore include
both financial firms and markets.

Before attempting to design such a regulatory framework, we need to
examine what the framework’s goals should be. The primary goal for
regulating financial risk is micro-prudential: maximizing economic
efficiency. Systemic risk is a form of financial risk, so efficiency should
certainly be a goal in its regulation. But systemic risk also represents risk to
the financial system itself. Any framework for regulating systemic risk
therefore should include this macro-prudential goal: protecting the financial
system itself.5

II. MAXIMIZING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Financial regulation can help to maximize economic efficiency by
correcting market failures. I believe that at least four types of partly
interrelated market failures occur within the financial system: information
failure, rationality failure, principal-agent failure, and incentive failure.

A. Correcting Information Failure
Complexity is the main cause of financial information failure.6
Financial markets and products are already incredibly complex, and that

5

For a critical discussion of the rationale of financial regulation, see EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE
OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW, THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS (2012).
6
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 211 (2009/2010). Information failure can arise from other causes as well,
including the potential for transaction costs relating to information acquisition to diminish the value of new
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complexity is certain to increase. Profit opportunities are inherent in
complexity, due in part to investor demand for securities that more precisely
match their risk and reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage increases
complexity as market participants take advantage of inconsistent regulatory
regimes both within and across national borders. And new technologies
continue to add complexity not only to financial products but also to
financial markets.7

Complexity has been undermining disclosure, which has been the
chief regulatory response to financial information failure.8 Although most, if
not all, of the risks on complex mortgage-backed securities were disclosed
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, many institutional investors—including
even the largest, most sophisticated, firms—bought these securities without
fully understanding them. 9

The Dodd-Frank Act puts great stock in the idea of improving
disclosure. 10 I fear its efficacy will be limited, however. Commentators have
questioned whether some financial structures are getting so complex that
they are incomprehensible. 11 Furthermore, it may well be rational for an
information (and thus the incentive to acquire such information). Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (June 1980).
7
I have argued that there are two aspects to complexity: cognitive complexity, meaning that things are too
complicated and non-linear to understand; and temporal complexity, meaning that systems work too
quickly and interactively to control. Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 6, at 214-15.
Engineers sometimes refer to temporal complexity as tight coupling. Id.
8
See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1197 (1999) (discussing the general purpose of disclosure in
the Exchange Act and the Securities Act).
9
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH LAW REVIEW
1109, 1110 (2008).
10
E.g. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 124
Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) (requiring additional disclosure).
11
See, e.g., David Barboza, Complex El Paso Partnerships Puzzle Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at
C1 (discussing that “one industry giant, the El Paso Corporation, is growing ever more reliant on deals
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investor to invest in high-yielding complex securities without fully
understanding them. Among other reasons, 12 the investor simply may not
have the staffing to evaluate the securities, whereas failure in invest could
competitively prejudice the investor vis-à-vis others who invest.

This begs the question whether institutional investors will hire experts
as needed to decipher complex deals. The evidence suggests they do not
always do so, and theory explains why. Although experts may be hired to the
extent that their costs do not exceed the benefits gained from more fully
understanding the complexity, at some level of complexity those costs will
exceed, or at least appear to exceed any potential gain. This is because the
cost of hiring experts is tangible, whereas the benefit gained from fully
understanding complex transactions is intangible and harder to quantify—
especially since constantly innovating markets cause rapid informational
obsolescence. Managers attempting a cost-benefit analysis may well give
greater weight to the tangible cost and less credence to any intangible
benefit. The more complex the transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the
more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be out of equilibrium. 13

Information failure not only undermines investor disclosure. It also
undermines the ability of regulators themselves to keep up with the financial

[using off-balance sheet partnerships] so complex that securities experts call them incomprehensible”). It
appears hyperbolic to say that structures created by humans cannot be understood by humans. The larger
problem may be that relatively few people can understand the structures and that many structures may not
be able to be understood by any single person.
12
For a comprehensive review of these reasons, see Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
supra note 9, at 1113-15.
13
The analysis above is taken from Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, id.
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industry, and indeed regulators have extreme difficulty keeping up with
financial innovation. 14

A possible way to address information failure resulting from
complexity would be to require investments and other financial products to
become more standardized. One of the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act, for
example, is to standardize more derivatives transactions. To this end, the Act
requires many derivatives to be cleared through clearinghouses, 15 which
generally require a high degree of standardization in the derivatives they
clear.16

But standardization can backfire. Dodd-Frank’s clearinghouse
requirement might inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the
clearinghouses themselves. And the overall economic impact of
standardization is unclear because standardization can stifle innovation and
interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when
firms craft financial products tailored to the particular needs and risk
preferences of investors.

Dodd-Frank also attempts to address information failure by requiring
sellers of securitization products to retain a minimum unhedged position in
each class of securities they sell—the so-called “skin in the game.” 17 This
14

See, e.g., Dan Awrey, “Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets” 37-51
(Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 49/2011, Sept. 2011), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1916649 (discussing the relationship between complexity and financial
innovation in the regulation of OTC derivatives).
15
Dodd-Frank Act sec. 723(a), § 2.
16
This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd-Frank includes an exception for derivatives that
a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 723(a), § 2(h)(3).
17
See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 941, § 15G (directing the SEC to require sponsors of asset-backed securities to
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too can backfire. By retaining residual risk portions of certain complex
securitization products they were selling, underwriters may actually have
fostered false investor confidence, contributing to the 2008 financial crisis.
Complexity, in other words, not only can cause information asymmetry but
also mutual misinformation.18

In our world of complexity, disclosure will not always be sufficient to
correct information failure. Moreover, even perfect disclosure would be
insufficient to mitigate information failures that cause systemic risk.
Individual market participants who fully understand the risk will be
motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily the financial system as a
whole. A market participant may well decide to engage in a profitable
transaction even though doing so could increase systemic risk, since much of
the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be externalized onto other
market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an
economic collapse.19

There are, therefore, no complete solutions to the problem of financial
information failure.

B. Correcting Rationality Failure
Even in financial markets, humans have bounded rationality—a type
of information failure, but one distinct and important enough to merit a
retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the underlying assets).
18
See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 6, at 241-42 (discussing mutual
misinformation).
19
See Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 3 (explaining this concept and describing it as a type of
“tragedy of the commons”). It is a tragedy of the commons insofar as market participants suffer from the
actions of other market participants; it is a more standard externality insofar as non-market participants
suffer from the actions of market participants.
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separate category. Investors are complacent, following the herd in their
investment choices and over-relying on heuristics, such as rating-agency
ratings.20 And market participants are also prone to panic. 21

Dodd-Frank attempts to fix a sliver of this problem by attempting to
improve rating-agency ratings.22 However, the actions of S&P and Moody’s
during the 2008 financial crisis arguably met the Act’s requirements, even
had those requirements applied during the financial crisis.23

The regulatory hurdle is that human nature cannot be easily changed.
It is unclear—and Dodd-Frank does not address—how complacency can be
remedied. And although panics are often the triggers that commence a chain
of systemic failures, it is impossible to identify all the causes of panics that
can trigger systemic risk.

C. Correcting Principal-Agent Failure
Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting from conflicts of
interest between managers and owners of firms. The Dodd-Frank Act
attempts to fix this traditional type of conflict. It ignores, however, a much
more insidious principal-agent failure: the intra-firm problem of secondarymanagement conflicts. 24 The nub of the problem is that secondary managers

20

Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 373, 379-83 & 404-05 (2008).
21
For a thoughtful analysis of how rationality failures help to explain the 2008 financial crisis, see Geoffrey
P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations
Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2010).
22
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 931-939H.
23
[Explain why-cite]
24
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management
Agency Costs, 26 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 457 (2009).
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are almost always paid under short-term compensation schemes, misaligning
their interests with the long-term interests of the firm.

Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing information
asymmetry between technically sophisticated secondary managers and the
senior managers to whom they report. For example, as the VaR, or value-atrisk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became more accepted,
financial firms began compensating secondary managers not only for
generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured
by VaR. 25 Secondary managers turned to investment products with low VaR
risk profile, like credit-defaults swaps that generate small gains but only
rarely have losses. They knew, but did not always explain to their superiors,
that any losses that might eventually occur would be huge.

In theory, firms can solve this principal-agent failure by paying
managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation
schemes—e.g., deferred compensation based on long-term results. In
practice, however, that solution must overcome a collective action problem:
firms that offer their secondary managers longer-term compensation may not
be able to hire as competitively as firms that offer more immediate
compensation. Regulation will be needed to solve this collective action
problem not only within nations but also across nations, because good
secondary managers can work in financial centers worldwide.

D. Correcting Incentive Failure
25

See, e.g., PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 568
(3d ed. 2006).
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Risk dispersion can create benefits, such as investment diversification
and more efficient allocation of risk. But risk can be marginalized, becoming
so widely dispersed that rational market participants individually lack the
incentive to monitor it. 26 This problem is not unlike the tragedy of the
anticommons in property law; where too many owners have rights to
exclude others from a scarce resource, no individual owner has an effective
privilege of use and the resource becomes prone to underuse.27 In a financial
market context, by analogy, where too many owners (e.g., investors) have
rights in a scarce resource (a class of securities), no single investor will have
a sufficient amount at risk to individually motivate monitoring.
Undermonitoring caused by this incentive failure appears to have
contributed, at least in part, to the 2008 financial crisis.28

The problem of incentive failure is difficult to solve. Although
regulation could require—perhaps for certain large issuances of complex
securities—that a minimum unhedged position be held by a single
sophisticated investor in each class of securities, 29 regulatory attempts to
limit risk dispersion would have tradeoffs: increasing the potential for
regulatory arbitrage, impairing the ability of parties to achieve negotiated
market efficiencies, and possibly even increasing financial instability. 30

E. Summary
26

See Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW issue no. 3
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721606.
27
See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 621 (1998).
28
Cf. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, Speech before the Fifth ECB Central
Banking Conference (Nov. 13, 2008) (arguing that ‘the root cause of the [financial] crisis was the overall
and massive undervaluation of risk across markets, financial institutions and countries’); Joe Nocera, Risk
Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine).
29
For a discussion of this type of regulation, see Marginalizing Risk, supra note 26.
30
Id.
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I’ve so far examined the first goal of any regulatory framework for
managing systemic risk: maximizing economic efficiency within the
financial system. There are at least four types of market failures that impair
efficiency. Information failure is primarily caused by complexity, for which
there are no perfect solutions. Rationality failure is difficult, if not virtually
impossible, to correct because human nature cannot be easily changed.
Principal-agent failure can theoretically be addressed by paying managers—
including secondary managers—under longer-term compensation schemes;
but in practice that solution must overcome collective action problems, both
within and across national borders. And the problem of incentive failure has
only second-best solutions. Regulation therefore cannot completely prevent
market failures within the financial system. 31

Let’s next discuss the second goal of any regulatory framework for
managing systemic risk—protecting the financial system itself. Although
uncorrected market failures can lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of
capital within the financial system, they also can contribute to systemic
failures.

III. PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ITSELF

There are at least three ways that regulation could protect the financial
system itself. First, regulation could attempt to limit the triggers of systemic
31

In other contexts, I have summarized these markets failures more intuitively as the “3Cs” of complexity,
conflicts, and complacency—complexity corresponding to information failure and incentive failure;
conflicts corresponding to principal-agent failure; and complacency corresponding to rationality failure.
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
REVIEW 549 (2009) (first suggesting the 3Cs categorization). Combined with the tragedy of the commons
(see infra note 47), these failures collectively can be referred to as the 3Cs and the TOC.
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risk. Second, regulation could attempt to limit the transmission of systemic
shocks. Third, regulation could attempt to stabilize the financial system
when afflicted by systemic shocks.

A. Limiting the Triggers of Systemic Risk
Ideal regulation would act ex ante, eliminating the triggers of systemic
risk.32 Realistically, however, we cannot eliminate those triggers. I have
mentioned that although panics are often the triggers that commence a chain
of systemic failures, it is impossible even to identify all the causes of panics.
To some extent also, the market failures discussed 33 could trigger
panics or other systemic shocks. For example, information failure, principalagent failure, and incentive failure could, individually or in combination,
cause one or more large firms to overinvest, leading to bankruptcy; and
rationality failure could cause prices of securities in a large financial market
to collapse. As I’ve shown, these market failures cannot be completely
corrected.

It is inevitable, therefore, that our financial system will face systemic
shocks from time to time. Consider next how to limit the transmission of
these shocks.

B. Limiting the Transmission of Systemic Shocks

32

Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial Regulation,
15 CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 257, 258 (2011) (observing that “[o]nce a failure occurs, there may already be
economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic”).
33
See supra Part II.
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Second-best regulation could act ex post, after a systemic shock is
triggered, by limiting the transmission of the shock—i.e., limiting its
contagion. This approach takes inspiration from chaos theory, which holds
that in complex engineering systems—and, I have argued, also in complex
financial systems—failures are almost inevitable. 34 Therefore remedies
should focus on breaking the transmission of these failures. 35

To break the transmission of systemic failures would require that the
transmission mechanisms all be identifiable. It probably is not feasible,
though, to identify all those mechanisms in advance. Nonetheless, based on
a study of four financial crises in the past century, Professor Iman Anabtawi
of UCLA and I have attempted to describe at least one such transmission
mechanism. 36

We argue that two otherwise independent correlations can combine to
transmit localized economic shocks into broader systemic crises. The first is
an intra-firm correlation between a firm’s financial integrity and its exposure
to risk from low-probability adverse events that either constitute or could
lead to economic shocks. The second is a system-wide correlation among
financial firms and markets.

34

See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 6, at 248-49. One aspect of chaos theory is
deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the system, the more
likely it is that failures will occur. Thus, the most successful (complex) systems are those in which the
consequences of failures are limited. In engineering design, for example, this can be done by decoupling
systems through modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will
systemically trigger a failure in another part.
35
Id.
36
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1349 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735025.
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The 2008 financial crisis, for example, almost certainly was caused, or
at least made worse, by the two correlations working in combination.
Subprime mortgage loans were bundled together as collateral to partially
support the payment of complex mortgage-backed securities that were sold
to banks and other financial firms worldwide. 37 When home prices began
falling, some of these mortgage-backed securities began defaulting,
requiring financial firms heavily invested in these securities to write down
their value, causing these firms to appear, if not be, more financially risky. 38
This represented a failure of these firms to see, or at least to fully appreciate,
the intra-firm correlation between low-probability risk—in this case, the risk
that home prices would significantly fall—and firm integrity. 39

The 2008 financial crisis also involved a failure to see system-wide
correlations—not only the tight interconnectedness among banks and nonbank financial firms but also the tight interconnectedness between financial

37

To some extent, the U.S. government itself pressured banks and other mortgage lenders to make and
securitize subprime mortgage loans, in order to expand homeownership. See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON, THE
LOST CAUSE: THE FAILURE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION (2011),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/FSO-2011-02-g.pdf. Misguided government policy can certainly contribute to
systemic risk. See, e.g., e-mail from Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions,
Columbia University Graduate School of Business, to the author (Oct. 13, 2011) (observing that
“[g]overnment policy is the main contributor to systemic risk, not just in the recent crisis, but more
generally”).
38
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
39
The problem of assessing the risk of low-probability adverse events is especially acute during periods in
which there have been no major adverse economic shocks. Recent stability then allays fears of adverse
occurrences, and market participants begin to view the recent event-data as following a normal distribution,
in which observations that deviate dramatically from the mean lie in the distribution’s thin tails. In reality,
however, longer-term data may reveal a distribution of outcomes with higher kurtosis, or “fat tails,” so that
the true risk of extreme events is far greater than it is under a normal distribution. Market participants may
also underestimate mundane low-probability events. Unusual events, such as a large meteor hitting the
earth, are highly salient, whereas more mundane events, such as changes in collateral value, are
commonplace, possibly existing on a continuum. The very familiarity with collateral of individuals
working in the financial sector might have led them to underestimate the potential consequences of a drop
in collateral prices. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 36.
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firms and markets. 40 What made the financial crisis so devastating was that
these failures combined to facilitate the transmission of economic shocks.

Regulation should try to increase awareness of these types of
correlations and limit their potential to combine. Prof. Anabtawi and I have
shown, however, that the same types of market failures that impair
efficiency—which I have just demonstrated cannot be completely prevented
by regulation 41—make it unlikely that financial market participants will use
sufficient effort to either identify the correlations or attempt to prevent their
combining.42 Furthermore, we have identified only one of potentially many
transmission mechanisms for systemic failure.43 Regulators therefore need to
turn to ways to stabilize the financial system that go beyond limiting the
transmission of systemic shocks.

C. Stabilizing the Afflicted Financial System
Regulation could also work ex post even after a systemic shock has
been triggered and is being transmitted. The regulation would then attempt
to stabilize the afflicted financial system. This could be done by trying to
stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets impacted by the

40

The tight interconnectedness described above also can have a temporal component insofar as the
connections, being interactive, work too quickly to control. See supra note 7.
41
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42
Information and incentive failure, for example, can cause failures to identify or fully appreciate both
correlations: between low-probability risk and firm integrity, and among financial firms and markets.
Rationality failure can also foster failures to identify or fully appreciate the first correlation: between lowprobability risk and firm integrity. And principal-agent failure can result in a failure to identify or fully
appreciate the first correlation: between low-probability risk and firm integrity. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz,
supra note 36.
43
Cf. supra note 37 (noting that misguided government policy can contribute to systemic risk). Being
driven by short-term political decisions and other non-economic factors, government policy will always be
a risk factor.
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transmission.44 This approach again takes inspiration from chaos theory,
insofar as that theory holds that remedies should also focus on limiting the
consequences of failures.45

There are at least two ways that regulation could stabilize systemically
important firms and financial markets: by ensuring liquidity to those firms
and markets, and by requiring those firms and markets to be more internally
robust.

1. Ensuring Liquidity to Firms and Markets. Liquidity has
traditionally been used, especially by government central banks, to help
prevent financial firms from defaulting. The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, for
example, has had this role of lender of last resort to banks. 46 And the
European Commission is in the process of attempting to help recapitalize
European banks that are exposed to sovereign-debt risk.

Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms would
follow this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least be
partly privatized by taxing those firms to create a systemic risk fund.
Privatizing the source of liquidity would help to address the public costs of a
lender of last resort: the shifting to taxpayers of the costs of loans that are
not repaid, and the fostering of moral hazard that could result by
encouraging financial firms—especially those that believe they are “too big
to fail”—to be fiscally reckless. Also, internalizing costs by privatizing the
44

To the extent regulation stabilizes a systemically important firm that otherwise would be failing due to
endogenous or non-systemic exogenous causes, the regulation could also be viewed as an ex ante solution.
45
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
46
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2010).
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source of liquidity would help to address the dilemma that market
participants, even those that are not (and that know they are not) too big to
fail, are economically motivated to create externalities that could have
systemic consequences. 47

Perversely, the Dodd-Frank Act undercuts liquidity by sharply
limiting the power of the Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to
individual or insolvent financial firms. 48 That categorical limitation appears
somewhat excessive, if not dangerous; a lender of last resort can be an
important safeguard if it acts judiciously. Even more perversely, the idea of
a systemic risk fund was originally included in the bill that would become
the Dodd-Frank Act but was taken out before enactment because of
opposition by politicians who believed that the fund would increase moral
hazard by institutionalizing bailouts. 49 I believe that belief is misguided. The
likelihood that systemically important firms will have to make additional
contributions to the fund to replenish bailout monies should motivate those
firms to monitor each other and help control each other’s risky behavior.

The European Commission apparently has been considering the idea
of a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial
sector.50 Although the ultimate use of the tax revenues is currently

47

Cf. supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
Dodd-Frank Act § 1101.
49
S. Amdt. 3827, 111th Cong. (2010) (eliminating the proposed $50 billion dollar fund, financed by a tax
on banks, that would help wind down failed financial companies).
50
European Commission, Taxation of the Financial Sector, a Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: (Brussels COM (2010) 549/5; SEC (2010) 1166). See also European Draft Directive on a
Common System of Financial Tax (Sept. 28, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm.
48
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unresolved,51 news reports indicate that an originally contemplated use was
a systemic risk fund. 52 The IMF also appears to be using the European
Commission tax proposal as a platform to announce that “new taxes on
banks [are] needed to provide an insurance fund for future financial
meltdowns and to curb excessive risktaking.” 53

I’ve so far discussed ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically
important firms. But recall that financial markets too can be triggers and
transmitters of systemic risk. Liquidity can also be used to stabilize
systemically important financial markets.54 For example, in response to the
post-Lehman collapse of the commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve
created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as a lender
of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary
liquidity distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated
issuers that could not otherwise sell their paper. 55 The CPFF apparently
helped to stabilize the commercial paper market. 56

51

Id. (indicating that one of the possible uses of the tax would be to provide a source of funds for the EU).
Commission Proposes a Bank Tax to Cover the Costs of Winding Down Banks that Go Bust (May 26,
2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/news/economy/100526_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
53
Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks or Risk Crisis, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2010,
at 25 (London-final ed.) (paraphrasing an announcement by the IMF’s then-Managing Director Dominique
Strauss-Kahn).
54
This was first proposed in Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 225-30.
55
See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper
Funding Facility, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 423 (April 1, 2010).
56
Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial paper market”).
This is very different from quantitative easing, in which a central bank purchases securities as a form of
monetary policy. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve has been engaged in quantitative easing programs,
purchasing U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold down long-term interest rates. In contrast, I
contemplate the task of a market liquidity provider of last resort as much more targeted: to prevent market
collapses due to panic.
52
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This same approach can be applied more broadly to respond to panic
in securities market.57 Say, for example, that the intrinsic value—effectively
the present value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a
type of mortgage-backed security is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents
on the dollar. If the market price of those securities had fallen significantly
below that number, say, to 20 cents on the dollar, the market liquidity
provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents on the dollar,
thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder
of the mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity
provider could, for example, agree to pay a higher “deferred purchase price”
if the securities turn out to be worth more than expected. 58 This is just one
(simplified) example of the flexible pricing approaches used in structured
financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain value which could
be adapted to a market liquidity provider’s purchases. 59

2. Requiring Firms and Markets to be More Internally Robust.
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms

57
One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest at a deep discount to stabilize
markets and still make money, private investors would not also do so, thereby eliminating the need for
some sort of governmental market liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at investing firms will
not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when other
investors have abandoned the market. Another answer is that private investors usually want to buy and sell
securities, without having to wait for their maturities; whereas a market liquidity provider of last resort
should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary.
58
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008
(Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., Edward Elgar 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352563 (using this example).
59
Alternatively, a market liquidity provider of last resort could attempt to stabilize the market by entering
into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging—in effect, the
market’s irrationality element—thereby stimulating private investment. By hedging—and not actually
purchasing securities directly—the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking less investment
risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable. Id.
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and markets by requiring them to be more internally robust.60 This could be
accomplished in various ways. First consider firms.

The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, requires banks and, to the extent
designated as “systemically important,” other financial firms to be subject to
a range of capital and similar requirements. 61 Addressing the possibility that
a firm could nevertheless end up failing, the Act also requires these firms to
submit a resolution plan—a so-called “living will”—that sets forth how the
firm would liquidate in an orderly manner to minimize further systemic
impact. 62

The extent to which these types of approaches will work, and their
potential impact on efficiency, are open questions. Reducing a firm’s
leverage, for example, can certainly enable the firm to withstand economic
shocks and reduce its chance of failure.63 The Basel capital requirements,
however, did not prevent the many bank failures resulting from the 2008
financial crisis. Setting regulatory limits on leverage could also backfire
because some leverage is good but there is no optimal across-the-board
amount of leverage that is right for every firm. Regulation should at least
focus, however, on attempting to prevent firms from opportunistically
overleveraging themselves during boom times, thereby correcting that type
of cyclical imbalance.
60

Although I refer to regulation requiring firms to become more internally robust as ex post (in the sense
that more robust firms can better withstand a systemic shock), such regulation could also be viewed as ex
ante in the sense that robust firms are less likely to fail and thereby trigger a systemic shock. I am still
pondering the appropriate ex-ante/ex-post distinction.
61
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 115(b) & 165(i). The Dodd-Frank Act directs the Federal Reserve, for example, to
set “prudential” capital standards for certain large financial firms, including a maximum debt-to-equity
ratio of 15:1. Id. § 165(j).
62
Id. § 165(d).
63
Cf. text following note 4, supra (discussing highly leveraged firms engaging in fire-sales of assets).
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One also might question Dodd-Frank’s living-will requirement. Ex
ante plans (such as a liquidation plan made when a financial firm is healthy)
rarely match ex post realities (such as the realities facing the firm when
financially challenged). Moreover, it is uncertain whether future politicians
would, or should, force the liquidation of a large financial firm, even
pursuant to its living will, without considering the consequences at that time.

The Dodd-Frank Act also includes procedures for limiting a
systemically important firm’s right to make risky investments—often
referred to as the Volcker Rule. 64 This is a highly paternalistic approach,
substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a firm’s own business
judgment. I’m generally skeptical of any rule that attempts to protect a
sophisticated financial firm from itself65—and indeed, Moody’s has warned
that a leaked early draft of interagency rules implementing the Volcker Rule
would, if adopted, probably “diminish the flexibility and profitability of
banks’ valuable market-making operations and place them at a competitive
disadvantage to firms not constrained by the rule.” 66

Dodd-Frank appropriately does require many large public firms to
institute internal governance procedures to protect the firm, including
64

See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13 (codifying steps to implement the Volcker Rule limiting proprietary
trading). Several federal agencies—the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—recently proposed rules to implement this.
65
I recognize that even sophisticated financial firms sometimes might not fully understand a highly
complex investment. Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing misinformation). The ultimate
question of the value of the Volcker Rule will therefore be empirical: whether the benefits of its limitation
on proprietary trading will outweigh profits lost by losing the ability to engage in such trading. Although
some may argue that those benefits, which accrue to all, should be more highly weighted than profits,
which accrue only to the financial firms themselves, my proposal for a privatized systemic risk fund should
help to internalize any harm of proprietary trading. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
66
Edward Wyatt, Regulators to Set Forth Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2011 (quoting Moody’s).
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establishing risk committees (with at least one risk-management expert)
responsible for enterprise-wide risk management oversight. 67 Well managed
firms should—and in my experience already do—have these types of
procedures and committees.

Also, appropriately in my judgment, the Dodd-Frank Act does not
attempt to artificially limit the size of financial firms. Some have argued that
size limits would minimize the potential moral hazard from firms that
believe they are “too big to fail.” There is, however, no clear evidence of
such risky behavior, and financial firm losses can be explained by other
reasons. Size should be governed by the economies of scale and scope
needed for firms to successfully compete, domestically and abroad—so long
as that size is manageable.

We should be cautious, however, of financial firms that increase their
size, especially by acquisition of other firms, primarily to satisfy senior
management egos. Dodd-Frank indirectly addresses this concern (at least
weakly) by linking senior executive compensation to long-term results—for
example, requiring stock exchanges to adopt standards whereby listed
companies implement policies to recoup senior executive compensation in
the event of an accounting restatement. 68

Another way that regulation could make systemically important firms
more internally robust is by requiring at least some portion of their debt to

67
68

Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h).
Id. § 954.

ECB Keynote Address.docx

24

be in the form of so-called contingent capital. 69 Contingent capital debt
would automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence of pre-agreed
events. Requiring contingent capital is therefore effectively like requiring a
pre-planned debt restructuring or workout.

It’s unclear if regulatory-imposed contingent capital would be
efficient. If contingent capital is a good idea, markets themselves should
implement it; I don’t see any market failures impeding that implementation.
I’m also skeptical whether regulatory-imposed contingent capital might have
unforeseen consequences. For example, might automatic conversions of debt
claims to equity interests create counterparty risk by reducing the value of
firms holding those claims? 70

Finally, regulation could focus on making systemically important
firms more internally robust at least to the extent such firms provide public
goods. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act (which has
since been revoked) had created a separation between commercial and
investment banking—the former including deposit taking and lending, the
latter including securities underwriting and investing. Although the DoddFrank Act does not reinstitute this separation, the final report of the U.K.
Independent Commission on Banking (often called the Vickers Report 71)
recommends a more limited form of separation, which it calls ring-fencing,
intended to protect the “basic banking services of safeguarding retail
69

See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 795 (2011).
70
The conversion would constitute an actual reduction in value if the pre-agreed trigger is sensible.
71
Although I provided input for this Report in a November 12, 2010 meeting at All Souls College,
University of Oxford, with Commission Chairman Sir John Vickers and other members of the
Commission’s Secretariat, I did not suggest the ring-fencing procedure that the Report eventually adopted.
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deposits, operating secure payments systems, efficiently channelling savings
to productive investments [i.e., making loans], and managing financial
risk.”72 The ring-fencing proposed in the Vickers Report appears to have
similarities to ring-fencing used in the United States to protect essential
public utilities, which often operate as subsidiaries within holding-company
structures.73

Ring-fencing is more of a micro- than macro-prudential approach
since its focus is more on protecting retail banking activities rather than on
preventing systemic collapse. 74 Nonetheless, to the extent it improves
consumer confidence, ring-fencing of retail banking might help to improve
the real economy.

I have discussed how regulation could help to stabilize firms.
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important markets. This

72

Vickers Report, at 7.
In expert testimony to a state public service commission, I have recently defined utility ring-fencing as
follows: “The term ring-fencing is not always clearly defined. By ‘ring-fencing,’ I mean protection of [the
utility subsidiary] and its assets from harm caused by the [utility subsidiary’s] affiliates. A primary goal of
ring-fencing is protecting the [utility subsidiary] from harm caused by a possible bankruptcy of one or more
of its affiliates. This is achieved by making it unlikely that an affiliate’s bankruptcy will involuntarily force
the [utility subsidiary] into bankruptcy or cause a substantive consolidation of the affiliate and the [utility
subsidiary] or cause the [utility subsidiary] to voluntarily file for bankruptcy. Another goal of ring-fencing
is protecting the [utility subsidiary’s] assets from being raided by an affiliate. This can be achieved by
imposing dividend restrictions on the [utility subsidiary] and by restricting non-arm’s length transactions
that are unfair to the [utility subsidiary].” The Vickers Report similarly proposes that the “banks’ UK retail
activities [] be carried out in separate subsidiaries. The UK retail subsidiaries would be legally,
economically and operationally separate from the rest of the banking groups to which they belonged.”
Vickers Report at 11.
74
Cf. Laurence Kotlikoff, Why the Vickers Report Failed the UK and the World, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011
(observing, among other things, that the flaw of “ring-fencing good banks and letting bad banks do their
thing” is demonstrated by “the collapse of Lehman Brothers [which Prof. Kotlikoff likens to a bad bank],
whose failure nearly destroyed the global financial system”).
73

ECB Keynote Address.docx

26

could occur, for example, by requiring appropriate circuit breakers, a topic
which I do not (unfortunately) have the time to discuss.75

D. Summary
Regulation could protect the financial system in at least three ways:
by limiting the triggers of systemic risk, by limiting the transmission of
systemic shocks, and by attempting to stabilize the system. Eliminating the
triggers of systemic risk is not feasible. Eliminating the transmission of
systemic shocks is likewise not feasible.

It therefore is critical to try to stabilize the financial system against the
consequences of systemic shocks. This will involve stabilizing both
systemically important financial firms and markets impacted by the shocks. I
have examined two approaches to stabilization: ensuring liquidity to those
firms and markets, and requiring those firms and markets to be more
internally robust.

I am reasonably comfortable with the first approach (ensuring
liquidity), especially if the source of the liquidity could be privatized. That
not only would stabilize firms and markets but also would help to control the
motivation of systemically important firms to externalize their costs (and
thus reduce public costs). The extent to which regulation can efficiently
require systemically important firms and markets to be more internally
robust is a more open question.

75

For a discussion of market circuit breakers, see, e.g., Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 13981401.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS

I have attempted to build an analytical framework for regulating
systemic risk. Any such framework, however, will be imperfect and have
tradeoffs. Complexity and complacency, among other factors, make ex-ante
preventive regulation insufficient. Regulation therefore must operate ex post
as well, by attempting to limit the transmission of systemic risk and reduce
systemic consequences.

For example, regulation to limit principal-agent failures by paying
managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation
schemes would operate ex ante, or preventively. To avoid prejudicing the
competitiveness of firms in any given nation (or, as in the EU, any region),
this type of regulation ideally should be global.

Regulation to provide liquidity to systemically important firms and
markets would operate more ex post, by helping to stabilize the financial
system. The source of this liquidity could—and arguably should—be
privatized by requiring firms to contribute to a systemic risk fund. That type
of requirement should (again) ideally be global to avoid prejudicing the
competitiveness of any nation or region—a fact that the European
Commission has recognized in connection with its similar proposal to
impose a tax on the financial sector. 76

Thank you.

76

See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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